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Abstract: 
This paper argues that debates amongst economists triggered by the Stern Review are partly relevant, 
focusing on key parameters translating real ethical issues, and partly misplaced in that they do not 
consider enough other determinants of  climate change damages:  i)  the specifications of the utility 
function used for  the  assessments  (preference for  the  environment,  preference for  smooth  growth 
paths), ii) the interplay between uncertainty and the sequentiality of the decision, and iii) whether the 
growth engines behind the integrated assessment models can account for transient disequilibrium and 
sub-optimality. We derive some suggestions for any future research agenda in integrated assessment 
modelling, whatever the position of the analysts about the relevance of the inter-temporal optimisation 
framework and the Bayesian approach to uncertainty in the climate affair.
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Undoubtedly, the media success of the Stern Review (Stern, 2006), in addition to its richness, 
is due to an alarming assessment of climate change damages, calling for “strong and early action”, 
being delivered by a former Chief Economist of the World Bank and not by an ecologist activist. It 
was both praised4 and harshly criticized5 by the different leanings of the economic profession which 
concentrated on two controversial parameters of critical importance for a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), 
i.e. the pure time preference (PTP) and the curvature of the function linking consumption to its utility.
It is remarkable that this debate developed essentially amongst the tenants of the conventional 
CBA framework  and did not  mobilize  so much those who,  reluctant  to  monetizing damages  and 
sceptical  about  applying  intertemporal  optimisation  over  one  century,  experienced  alternative 
frameworks such as the Tolerable Windows or the Safe Corridor Approach (Petschel-Held et al, 1999; 
Tóth, 2003) with more complex and multi-disciplinary models but an explicit acceptance of normative 
targets not grounded in an economic framework. From their perspective, the Stern report is a risky and 
desperate venture to expand conventional CBA beyond its scope of relevance.
The bottom line of this paper is to start from an internal appraisal of the dispute, i.e. accepting 
the discounted utility criterion as an appropriate framework in the climate affair.  This appraisal will 
be used to spell out a set of methodological issues to be tackled by new generations of integrated 
assessment  of  climate  policies.  These issues  concern all  analysts  including the  sceptics  about  the 
conventional economic toolbox. The Ariadne’s thread of this appraisal is made up with two diagnoses:
- the gap between Stern’s detailed description of climate change impacts and the methodology 
used for their aggregate valuation. He casts serious doubts about the chief assumption behind low 
estimates of climate damages (Mendelsohn et al, 2000; Tol 2002b), namely that societies can adapt to 
an evolving climate with no significant transition costs. However his toolbox fails to incorporate the 
key element of this diagnosis, namely the disequilibrium dynamics possibly triggered by the interplays 
between social and environmental changes;
- the fact that, perhaps driven by a professional reflex of using very stylised models whose 
analytical control is possible, and attracted by the revival of a familiar dispute, many economists did 
not focus the discussion on this gap. They rather conducted controversies on the discount rate and to a 
lesser extent on the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, at the risk of overshadowing the 
assessment of climate damages by the debates around a couple of very fragile parameters.
We first  show that the value of the PTP is not the only component of the preference system 
that  matters  for  the  trade-off  between the  short  term and the  long term.  We then show that  this 
parameter is less critical in a sequential decision-making approach because of the importance of the 
value of information and of its  many determinants.  In a third step,  we question the vision of the 
economic growth engine and of intragenerational equity that underpins conventional CBA.
1. Trade-offs between the short and long terms: the role of the preference systems
4 A  selection  of  comments  to  the  Stern  review  can  be  accessed  http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/1/2/20061028_Quotes-7.pdf
5 See for instance,  Dasgupta (2006), Mendelsohn (2006), Nordhaus (2006), Tol and Yohe (2006), Weitzman 
(2007a), to name only a few.
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The harshest debates about the Stern Review relate to the selection of a very low pure time preference 
(PTP) to assess climate change damages and climate policies6.  They in fact  repeat  an old dispute 
(Ramsey vs. Koopmans), which is likely not to come to an end because it intrinsically incorporates a 
positive dimension  (how people  do really behave)  and a normative one (how we should behave) 
(Arrow et al., 1995). This dispute is indeed framed around the Ramsey equation ( .r gρ η= + ) which 
is a catchy way to capture the interactions between critical aspects of preferences ( ρ  as the PTP and 
η as the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption) and technical change (r as the marginal 
productivity of capital and g the resulting growth of consumption) along an optimal growth pathway. 
To align the social  discount  rate on the economic growth rate is no longer  controversial  amongst 
economists  specialized  in  this  field:  if  future  generations  are  richer,  it  is  ethically  legitimate  to 
consider that the same burden (a mitigation cost or a damage cost) will affect less their welfare than 
that  of  current  generations.  There  is  no  contention  as  well  against  retaining  discount  rates 
corresponding to the most pessimistic assumptions in a context of uncertainty about economic growth 
(Newell and Pizer, 2001; Weitzman, 1998): in a stochastic framework, the least value of the discount 
rate tends to dominate in the far distant future and drives the results of the analysis.  Along the same 
line hold the arguments of Heal (2005) and Dasgupta (1999) that, if environmental disruption slows 
down economic growth, the discount rates should be lower.
The value of ρ , that governs the gap between the discount rate and the economic growth rate, is more 
contentious because of its inevitable ethical consequences.  The difficulty is that it makes sense in a 
formula stemming from what R. Hahn called a “ramseyification of the Solow’s model”7: it is used for 
normative analysis but, to inform public policy, it pretends to describe a reasonable state of the world. 
Over a one century time horizon, this does not mean a likely or best guess prediction but, at least, to 
secure that a given scenario, resulting from a specific worldview about the world future generations 
will experience, does not contain an intrinsic inconsistency. This imposes that ρ  cannot be selected 
totally independently from the other parameters of the projection.
Let us admit, like Stern, that the uncertainty about the existence of generations yet to be born is the 
only ethical justification for discounting utility and that this justifies a 0.01% PTP 8. The calibration of 
the model  should make this  value consistent  with values of  η , r,  and  g leading to plausible and 
consistent projections of future economies. Selecting an arbitrary PTP all other parameters equal and 
without such a consistency check has indeed profound ethical consequences. The most important one 
was well perceived in the early attempts to use  à la Ramsey  models for economic planning in the 
fifties a non-null ρ  prevents the social planner from sacrificing the current generation in the name of 
a brighter future (Stoleru, 1968)9 by preventing important capital  accumulation today to maximize 
consumption in the long term. Actually the magnitude of this ‘sacrifice’ is ultimately depending upon 
6 See elements of responses to criticisms on this respect in Stern Review team (2007).
7 Franck Hahn used this expression in a collection of essays to celebrate Bob Solow (Hahn, 1990), noting 
that adding perfect foresight to the Solow model ‘is its proper consummation’. The reason is that it endogenises 
the savings function, the core of the model,  which leads to a model that ‘may « fit » some time series’ but ‘does 
not  aid  understanding’ (p. 27).  The  oversight  of  this  type  of  caveat  may be  one  reason  why the  use  (and 
criticisms)  of  « ramseyified  Solow models »  in  the  climate  affair  triggered  a  permanent  mix  of  normative 
judgments and positive analyses of the real world.
8 Here a 0.95 probability they will exist in 2100. This argument joins the positions of Ramsey, Sen or Solow.
9 A similar interpretation of discounting can be found in Chichilnyski et al.(1995) who proposes a formula to 
protect the last generation without sacrificing the current ones.
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assumptions regarding capital deepening and capital productivity, which determine the links between 
savings and future consumption flows.
The same consistency check should also apply on any alternative proposal for weighting current and 
future generations to compensate for the role of the PTP in discounting on long term horizons. One of 
these  proposals  has  been  to  adjust  the  elasticity  of  the  marginal  utility  of  income.  The  Stern 
assumption ( 1η = ) has been contested by Gollier (2006) and Weitzman who suggest η = 2  to reflect 
risk-aversion in a consistent way with the risk premium revealed on insurance markets. Given that the 
Stern Review deals with uncertainties about climate change damages through a Monte Carlo technique 
picking 1000 possible scenarios and selecting η = 2  instead of 1η =  would indeed lead to a higher 
expected disutility of climate change damages.
However, this comes to mix up the marginal utility of income along a growth pathway under certainty 
with the marginal utility of a gain/loss in a lottery (the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function). 
Actually,  the Stern’s assumption of  1η =  is consistent with empirical estimates in growth models 
(Fellner 1967, Pearce and Ulph 1994)10.  The confusion comes from the fact that the curvature of the 
utility function works as a risk-aversion coefficient, giving a higher weight to lower income outcomes: 
if, one conjectures that there is a fifty-fifty probability that the per capita income will be either 150 or 
180 at a given date (compared to 100, as of today) then the certainty equivalent of this conjecture is 
164.3  (below  the  175  average  value)  assuming  a  natural  logarithm  utility  function.  But  this 
mechanical result from the decreasing marginal utility of income says nothing about what trade-off a 
society would accept between a risky growth pathway leading to a 180 expected value for income with 
a high variance and a scenario with a certain 150 income, we will come back to that later11. 
Actually  these  disputes  tended to  argue  that  Stern  was  “right”,  “wrong”  or  “right  for  the  wrong 
reasons”. But this way of conducting the debate, focussing it on the sole controversy about  the PTP 
gives to the external observer two rather questionable expectations: the first is that it is possible to 
select somewhat arbitrarily two out of the four canonical parameters of the Ramsey equation ( ρ and 
η ), the second that the uncertainty about the values of these parameters will be reduced to such a level 
that  they will  support  a reliable CBA on a century time horizon.  Beyond,  the major drawback of 
overly  focusing  on  the  terms  of  discounting  is  perhaps  to  pass  implicitly  the  message  that,  for 
economists, there is no case for climate action unless a low consumption discount rate is selected. 
The  easiest  way  of  understanding  why  this  message  is  misleading,  even  in  a  pure  economic 
perspective,  is  to  observe  that  the  Ramsey  formula  derives  from a  growth  model  with  a  single 
composite good. This oversimplification was legitimate to study the patterns of capital accumulation. 
As emphasized by Heal (2005), it becomes paradoxical to keep on referring to such a model when 
examining  trade-offs  between  the  environment  and  consumption  without  incorporating  the 
environment as an argument of the utility function. This leads to neglect: a) how the willingness to pay 
for environmental amenities may increase as future generations become richer and as these amenities 
may deteriorate under the threats of climate change;  b) the utility losses of our descendants for not 
10 Note that Hope (2008) showed that this revision of the value of η  does not change drastically the 
results because the effect of the discount rate outweighs the uncertainty effect in the PAGE model.
11 A well-accepted framework allowing to disentangle those two dimensions is still lacking. An attempt is 
made in Lecocq and Hourcade (2003) in a two period model. The same type of confusion is made when η  is 
interpreted as a measure of aversion to interpersonal inequality.
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using areas which would have become uninhabitable (foregone option value), c) the preference for not 
departing too much from familiar climates which one is more or less adapted to12, including the option 
values of various environmental assets and the ethical reluctance to launch experiments with our only 
planet Earth which may look like a Faustian bargain.
At the same aggregate level of analysis  of the interplays  between preferences and technology and 
within the same vision of a balanced growth pathway, using a ( , )U C E  utility function makes clearer 
that the trade-off between current and future consumption changes over time and is not driven solely 
by the PTP coefficient.  It  also depends on the decreasing marginal  utility of  consumption,  which 
makes the environment become a superior good beyond a certain income level (Guesnerie, 2004). The 
present value of long-term damages then results from two antagonistic forces, the deflating effect of 
the  PTP  and  the  inflating  effect  of  the  increasing  marginal  utility  of  the  environmental  good 
preservation relative to consumption. A similar insight has been given by Sterner and Persson (2007) 
who report that future scarcities that will be induced by the changing composition of the economy and 
climate  change  should  lead  to  rising  relative  prices  for  certain  goods  and  services,  raising  the 
estimated damage of climate change and counteracting the effect of discounting.  They show that 
taking relative prices into account can have as large an effect on economically warranted abatement 
levels as can a low discount rate, an intuition already explored by Tol (1994).
To sum up, in a model incorporating a more complete description of preferences, the justification of 
climate action is less totally dependent upon the pure preference for the present.
2. ‘One shot’ or sequential decision? The role of the value of information and of the shape of the 
damage curve
A second set of reasons for not overshadowing the assessment of climate policies by an extreme focus 
on the discount rate relates to the way uncertainty is dealt with and more precisely to the decision-
making framework adopted in the context of an ‘ocean of uncertainty’.
 
Each of the thousand scenarios of the Stern’s Monte-Carlo analysis results from a ‘one shot’ decision 
as if a climate policy had to be designed today for the entire century. The  Weitzman’s response to 
Stern (Waitzman, 2007b) fits in this ‘one shot’ framework and finds a justification for action in the 
“thickness” of the tail of the probability distribution of catastrophes. This is an interesting case of the 
infinite variance syndrome (Mandelbrot 1971, 1973) whereby a combination of uncertain parameters 
with finite  variance may lead mathematically to an outcome of  infinite  variance,  in this  case  the 
amount of present consumption the agent would be willing to give up in the present period to obtain 
one extra sure unit of consumption in the future period.
As underlined by Mandelbrot, this mathematical construct does not imply the existence of an infinite 
loss in the real world. It is rather a syndrome which signals the limits of the stochastic calculus and the 
necessity  to  resort  to  judgments  about  safety  thresholds  to  be  respected  to  avoid  uncontrollable 
outcomes (this is of common practice in civil engineering). But Weitzman’s interpretation differs and 
comes to say that, in the presence of a significant PTP and in the absence of environment in the utility 
function, the justification for action lies in demonstrating that climate change may lead to an infinite 
12 An attempt in this direction can be found in Ambrosi et al. (2003) who include the magnitude of climate 
change in the utility function to translate a willingness to pay for not interfering with the climate system.
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pricing for future costs and benefits. But such a demonstration may not make consensus in due time 
and is greatly dependent upon assumptions about the adaptive capacity of societies (see section 3 
below). We know, since the Trojan War that Cassandra is not always convincing and the question is 
thus, whether, or not, the consideration of a possible a catastrophe is a prerequisite for acting.
Clearly not if one retains  the framework proposed by the 2nd and 3rd IPCC reports. This framework 
states that given uncertainty about both damages and mitigation costs, the issue cannot be to find an 
optimal  pathway over the century in a once for  all  decision.  It  consists in a sequential decision-
making approach defining a short-term response pathway that preserves the possibility of mid-course 
corrections in function of new information (e.g. switching towards tighter concentration targets in 
case  of  bad  news  about  climate  risks):  « The  choice  of  abatement  paths  involves  balancing  the  
economic risks of rapid abatement now (that premature capital stock retirement will later be proved 
unnecessary) against the corresponding risk of delay (that more rapid reduction will then be required,  
necessitating premature retirement of future capital stock). » (IPCC 1996).
In such a framing the value of information (i.e. the value of preserving flexibility) proves to be at least 
as crucial as the discount rate or the value of the environment relative to that of the composite good. 
This  point,  highlighted  by  Manne  and  Richels  in  Buying  Greenhouse  Insurance  (1992)13 was 
exemplified in a debate in  Nature between Wigley,  Richels and Edmonds (1996) on one side, Ha 
Duong, Grubb and Hourcade (1997) on the other. The latter showed that considering 550 ppm as the 
expected value across a range of 450 ppm, 550 ppm and 650 ppm stabilisation target options, rather 
than as  a  deterministic  target,  makes  a  significant  difference  for  the  short  term optimal  pathway 
because of the cost of accelerated action if 450 ppm proves to be the desirable target. In this analysis 
the discount rate matter but it does so in conjunction with a) the inertia of the technical system which 
acts as a cost multiplier, should mitigation efforts accelerate between t-1 and t, b) the date of arrival  
of information (the more belated this information is expected to be, the more aggressive short term 
action has to be) and c) the subjective probability attached to each target.
Intuitively, unless the environment is included in the utility function, one can expect that what is true 
in a stochastic cost-effectiveness analysis (where concentration or temperature ceilings are used as a 
proxy of damages) may not hold in a stochastic cost-benefit framework. A ceiling indeed, which acts 
as a surrogate of the benefits of action is not impacted by discounting, whereas discounting changes 
the monetary values of avoided damages. Actually literature (Fisher et al., 2007, pp 234-236) suggests 
that this intuition is confirmed only under specific assumptions about the shape of the damage curve 
(Ambrosi et al., 2003).
With quadratic or hockey-stick functions indeed large damages occur far in the future and, unless they 
tend to infinity, do not justify early action for any significant long run social discount rate (say higher 
than 2%).  Conversely, if the damage curve presents thresholds, these discount rates are compatible 
with significant short-term action even without assuming large catastrophes. The main reason is that 
high values of climate sensitivity bring forward the time  to reach these thresholds (see Fig. 1 and 
Fig. 2)  which  in  turn  increases  the  present  value  of  damages.  Given  the  delay  of  maturation  of 
infrastructure programs on the mitigation side, this can suffice in concluding to the necessity of an 
early action to change their carbon content.
13 This insurance metaphor is in part misleading because in this case there is no insurance company you can 
contract with to be covered in case of adverse hazard.
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3. Profile and magnitude of damages: questions of transitory disequilibrium and expectations 
The question thus becomes this of the origins of such thresholds in the deployment of damages. At this 
stage,  the main source of misunderstanding between economists  and many other scientists,  which 
pervades in the WGII of the Ipcc report, is that non-linearities in the response of ecosystems (lato 
sensu i.e. including human-made urban ecosystems) to climate change are obviously critical but are 
not per se a social cost. Damages are negligible indeed if societies on which impacts befall are totally 
flexible and can adapt quickly. This flexibility depends on the inertia of pre-existing capital stocks but 
also on the institutional capacity of societies (including their anticipation skills).
If the economy is on a stable and high growth development pathway and can easily catch up in case of 
environmental  shock after  having adapted its  infrastructures, then climate change will  matter  only 
facing  with extreme  assumptions  (all  the  more  so  as  we  assume  rational  expectations  and  fully 
operational insurance markets).  Instead, if the impacted society is fragile, with myopic behavioural 
routines, and if technical and social inertia prevent an easy return to the equilibrium growth pathway, a 
cost  amplifying  effect may  create  an  important  wedge  between  a  direct  impact  and  its  ultimate 
consequences on welfare (Hallegatte et al. 2007b).
Assuming economies will adapt easily to climate change comes to neglect (i) uncertainty in regional  
climate predictions is one order of magnitude larger than in global predictions, (ii) the masking effect  
of climate variability may lead to detect too late or to misinterpret climate signals (iii)  the capital-
intensive nature and the inertia of adaptation measures (e.g. dams or building norms) entail risks of 
sunk costs of mal-adaptation  due to wrong expectations regarding the rate and direction of climate 
change and/or to institutional failures and technical barriers to adaptation (Hallegatte et al. 2007a).
In sum, methodologies assuming perfect foresight and optimal long run responses de facto assess the 
cost of a “changed climate” and fail to capture the transition costs of adapting to a changing climate 
and its trial and error process. These costs may be exacerbated under volatile climate signals such as 
demonstrated  by  Kelly  et  al  (2005)  for  the  Midwest  agriculture.  Actually,  be  it  in  the  field  of 
environment (Tol et al 1998, Schneider 2000) or in the field of energy (Hasset 1993) there are many 
examples of which the rational expectation with Bayesian learning hypothesis is not an acceptable 
caricature of reality. Again, removing this hypothesis makes the choice of the discount rate less critical 
for the valuation of damages.. 
The ultimate methodological question emerging from this diagnosis relates to the very nature of the 
‘growth engine’ underpinning the use of the Ramsey equation. This growth engine, the same as the 
Solow growth model, is very helpful to describe equilibrium growth pathways but not situations in 
which a deviation from this equilibrium cannot be easily  (Solow, 1987). This is a matter of capturing 
transitional disequilibria and not solely of describing ‘after adaptation’ new equilibria (Hallegate et al, 
2007b).  But  this  possibility  of  uneven  growth  pathways  forces  in  turn  to  revisit  the  preference 
structure  used  to  assess  the  welfare  implications  of  environmental  shocks.  A  regular  increase  in 
income from 100 to 150 in the course of 25 years does not have the same welfare implications as an 
erratic income pathway growing from 100 to 130, then regressing to 125 before a recovery up to 160 
and a final regression to 150. Each significant economic slow down carries indeed social tensions: a 
monthly  €3,000  is  an  achievement  for  someone  earning  €2,000  and  a  frustrating  regression  by 
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someone previously earning €3,500. The difficulty is to adequately account for downward revisions of 
growth in aggregate measures of welfare variations: a back of the envelope calculation of the cost 
(assuming a calculus conducted in 1871) of the First World War for France gives -0.3% of discounted 
GDP over one century!  Shall  we conclude that this bloody war was such a small cost for France 
(Jaeger  et al, 2008)? In the same way, the total GDP losses of the Marmara earthquake is 2% only 
after several years of recovery (see World Bank, 1999). Does this mean that the welfare losses were 
almost zero? Despite advances carried over with the use of recursive utility function (Ha-Duong et al, 
2004), progress remains to be made to capture social preferences for a steady and smooth growth 
pathway14. 
4. Individual weighting and intragenerational equity: benevolence or intérêts bien compris?
Another, less frequent, criticism to the Stern Review is addressed to its use of unitary weighting in 
aggregating individual welfare variations into the social welfare function. The issue is obvious: since 
most of the climate change impacts fall on the developing world, this weighting results in a higher 
value of aggregate damages than under the conventional practice of using Negishi coefficients which 
weight individuals in proportion of their income and gives a lesser value to the damages incurred by 
poorer populations.
The ethical justification of the unitary weighting is not as obvious as it seems at first glance. Indeed, 
given the assumption of decreasing marginal individual utility of income, the benevolent planner in 
charge of maximizing a social welfare function with such a weighting will charge all the burden of 
climate policies to richer individuals as long as the levels of income are not equated. Beyond its lack 
of  political  realism,  this  solution  can  be  rejected  on  normative  grounds.  Even  though  there  is 
legitimate question about the actual distribution of income, there is no specific argument to correct it 
at the occasion of climate policies15. 
Actually, a unitary weighting of  individuals  is  a  problematical  response to  the  ethical  difficulties 
raised by the use of Negishi weights to impose a no-redistribution constraint to the benevolent planner. 
This difficulty can be in part mitigated by a realistic description of damage propagation across regions 
and by a discussion of the attitude of countries vis-à-vis climate impacts falling beyond their boarders 
(Lecocq and Hourcade, 2004). Many examples given in the Stern Review suggest that severe damages 
on  one  region  may  propagate  to  neighbouring  regions,  for  instance  through  an  intensification  of 
international migration flows. Richer countries should thus consider not only impacts befalling within 
their own borders but also the ultimate consequences, including security issues, of damages befalling 
on poorer countries. Logically, this part of the total damages propagating to the richer countries should 
be accounted with their Negishi weights. This comes to upgrade the value of climate change impacts 
falling on the poorer without being exposed to the criticisms of using unrealistic egalitarian ethical 
judgments and of “imposing value judgments to the rest of the world”.
This implies a form of universal  solidarity ethic which may result  from a benevolent or altruistic 
attitude of rich countries or, more cynically, from a due accounting of their intérêts bien compris. 
14 One attempt in this direction was proposed by Chichilnysky et al. (1995)
15 This is why the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC (Stiglitz  et al., 1995, spm) cautiously stands on the 
statement that “for the purposes of the analysis, it is possible to separate efficiency from equity.”
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Conclusion: intertwined challenges for IA modelling and economic theory
The above analysis suggests that criticisms to the Stern review that focus on the choice of a very low 
pure time preference,  of  a unitary value for  the curvature of  the utility function and of a unitary 
weighting of individuals are both relevant and misplaced. They are relevant because they emphasize 
the disputable character of these parametric choices; they are partly misplaced because they do not use 
the  Stern review,  a  risky venture  within the  limits  of  the  economists’  toolbox,  as  an intellectual 
challenge to detect the methodological advances needed to address the deficiencies of this toolbox and 
its use in integrated assessment exercises, some of these advances being also worth considering in any 
alternative approach to integrated assessment. 
These can be first expressed in the language of the Arrow-Debreu axiomatic: the pure time preference 
is one price (the exchange rate between any asset at t+1 and the same asset at t) amongst others at any 
point  in  time:  the  value  of  environmental  amenities  relative  to  consumption  and  the  value  of 
information which itself depends on a broad set of parameters and beliefs about the magnitude and 
pace of deployment of damages, about inertia which governs how abatement costs at a time t depend 
on previous abatement efforts (Gerlagh et al., 2003) and about the pace of resolution of uncertainty. 
We thus need a new generation of IAMs capable of a rigorous accounting of this full set of prices and 
a richer description of preferences, including the preference for ‘smooth’ growth pathways.
But the discussion cannot go very far though without growth models that do not take the stability of 
growth pathways for granted. The crux of the matter, indeed, is to capture transitory disequilibria, in 
particular  provoked by decisions under  imperfect  expectations that  entail  large technico-economic 
inertia  and  potential  lock-ins.  Accounting  for  transient  disequilibria  and  sub-optimalities  in  both 
baselines and policy scenarios may lead, on top of upgrading the monetary estimates of damages, to 
better reflect the potential development dividend of mitigation policies yielded  by reducing some of 
the  disequilibria  prevailing in  the  no-policy scenario (for  example  upgrading the  resilience to  oil 
shocks, see Shukla et al, 2001).  
Beyond, the question remains of how to deal with potentially large but weak probability hazards that 
may result in thick tails of the probability distribution of damages. Actually, interpreting the infinite 
variance syndrome as reflecting the limitations of the Bayesian approach may facilitate the dialogue 
between integrated assessment approaches that rely on the conventional cost-benefit framework and 
those who prefer inverse modelling (Tóth 2003). In this dialogue, and even though there has been so 
far no significant attempt to use imprecise probability approaches in this field, these could be explored 
further to produce methods (of expert fusions for example), that do not rule out a priori an event being 
assigned almost zero probability in the prior distribution (Ha Duong, 2005).  
These advances will not change the crude fact that there is no hope to reach a consensus in due time 
(over the next two decades) on the raw material of any integrated further integrated assessment, i.e. 
ethical  parameters,  growth  regimes,  magnitude  of  climate  change  impacts,  adaptive  capacities  of 
societies. Since a consensus for an adequate action has to be reached despite such divergences, these 
advances are urgent, either within the conventional economic toolbox or within alternative approaches, 
to detect better the mechanisms at play in the formation of climate change damages and disentangle 
what controversy really matter and which does not.. This is a precondition for integrated assessment 
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models be of use to clarify what compromise should be made among controversial worldviews and 
opposite  interests  about  the  desirable  course  of  action in  the  following two decades,  prior  to  the 
extinction of the ocean of uncertainty that surrounds climate change.
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